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NOTES
AITACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT-CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-Garnishment of Wages
Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due Process: The
Sniadach Case and Its Implications £or Related Areas of
the Law
Americans today enjoy an unprecedented level of material
wealth, attributable in part to the great expansion of the modern
consumer credit industry.1 Unfortunately, readily available credit
has had numerous victims as well as many beneficiaries. Congress,
worried that the exploitation of consumers by unscrupulous creditors was a contributing cause of such diverse phenomena as
consumer bankruptcies,2 urban riots,3 and even suicide,4 passed reform legislation in 1967 to "safeguard the consumer."5
One hotly disputed portion of the consumer protection bill was
that dealing with wage garnishment. The most ambitious proposal
on this matter sought the total abolition of wage gamishment.6 Fac1. Consumer debt outstanding rose from a level of $5.665 billion in 1945 to
$63.821 billion in 1962. By July 1969 it had risen further to a level of $116.597 billion.
55 FEDERAL REsERVE BULL., Sept. 1969, at A54.
2. Hearings on H.R. 11,601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, at 502 (1967)
(statement of Sidney Margolius) [hereinafter Hearings]: "As is well known, there are
more consumer bankruptcies today than in the big depression of the 1930's. Such
personal bankruptcies ••• have jumped 240 per cent in the past ten years."
3. Hearings pt. 2, at 661 (statement of David Caplovitz): "Numerous newspaper
accounts have quoted ghetto residents as rationalizing the looting on the grounds that
they have been victimized and robbed by the merchants for many years."
4. Gannon, Seizing Pay-Unions, Firms, Lawyers Seek To Curb Garnishing as Its
Incidence Rises, Wall St. J., March 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6, reprinted in Hearings pt. I,
at 71:
One payday in January, auto worker Carl W. Clark discovered his entire week's
take-home pay of $112.39 had been turned over to the state of Indiana for delinquent state income taxes. Beset by debts, he asked officials at Ford Motor Co.'s
plant in suburban Chicago Heights, Ill., for his accrued vacation pay to tide him
over.
Next payday, he learned [that] Indiana-the state where he used to live-had
received $208.84 out of his $363.93 in wages and vacation pay. The 24 year-old
father of a young boy, not knowing how much he owed Indiana tax collectors
(the two deductions actually satisfied the claim) became despondent over the pay
loss. Two days later, Carl Clark placed a .22 calibre rifle under his chin and shot
a bullet into his brain.
This suicide has spurred anew wide-ranging inquiries into the consequences
of consumer debt problems.
5. Preamble to H.R. 11,601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in Hearings pt.
I, at 3. The "bill as enacted-the Consumer Credit Protection Act-may be found in
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
6. See H.R. 11,601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. II (1967), reprinted in Hearings pt. I,
at 35-36. At least two states-Pennsylvania and Texas-now have statutes which outlaw
wage garnishment entirely. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1966); TEX. REv. C1v. STAT. art.
4099 (Supp. 1966). In addition, wage garnishment prior to judgment is prohibited by
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.104, now in force in Oklahoma [OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14A (1969)], Utah [UTAH CoDE ANN. tit. 70A (1967)], and Guam.
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tors advanced in support of that proposal included the demonstrated
correlation between the number of consumer bankruptcies and the
harshness of garnishment laws,7 the fact that wage garnishment often
results in loss of employment,8 the need to alleviate the burden on
the courts that is created by the large number of garnishment cases,9
7. Hearings pt. I, at 419 (testimony of Estes Snedecor, Referee in Bankruptcy, D.
Ore.): ·
[T]he one overriding cause precipitating consumer bankruptcies is the garnishment
or threat of garnishment of wages coupled with an unrealistic wage exemption.
This is dramatically demonstrated by comparing the number of consumer bankruptcies in States permitting garnishment of wages with those prohibiting garnishment entirely or restricting it to only a small portion of wages.
Hearings pt. 1, at 506 (statement of Sidney Margolius):
It is noticeable that the states with the toughest garnishment laws [that is, those
that operate most harshly against the debtor] have the highest bankruptcy rates
including California, Ohio, Virginia, Michigan and Minnesota. Colorado, with
much less population, had about 4300 bankruptcies and wage-earner :plans in one
recent year, compared to only about 1000 in Texas and Pennsylvania which do
not permit garnishees. Virginia, with less population than Florida which does not
permit garnishees, has eight times as many bankruptcies. Ohio with about the
same population as Texas, has about 50 times the bankruptcies.
Figures for bankruptcy filings for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, yielded an
important comparison between the number of filings in states which have harsh garnishment laws and the number of filings in states which prohibit or strictly limit
garnishment of wages. The states with harsh laws had the following number of bankruptcy filings during that year:
Alabama
California
Colorado
Michigan

10,214
38,327
4,306
7,492

Minnesota
Ohio
Oregon
Tennessee

3,175
17,680
4,685
9,384

Virginia
4,844
The states with mild garnishment laws, on the other hand, had far fewer filings:
Alaska
208
South Carolina
160
Florida
1,416
South Dakota
182
Pennsylvania
1,601
Texas
1,330
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS ENDING
JUNE 30, 1968, table F-1. See also Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study
and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214 (1965); Snedecor, Why So Many Bankruptcies in Oregon?, 40 REF. J. 78 (1966).
8. Hearings pt. I, at 433 (statement of James E. Moriarty, Referee in Bankruptcy,
C.D. Cal.):
The effect of a garnishment can be devastating to a debtor. Most employers
dislike garnishments because of the extra work and cost. As a matter of policy
many employers will fire an employee after the second garnishment. Since California law permits multiple levies a worker could be fired within an eight-day
period, the time necessary to cover two weekly pay periods. Not only does this
challenge the ability of the worker to provide for the family needs, but a worker
who has been fired because of garnishment can become a faceless person in the
army of the unemployed. He may be a well-qualified machinist whose talents are
in demand, but he is unemployable.
At a time when skilled employees are in great demand we must conclude that
the exclusion of such a worker from our work force is a great waste of manpower.
For a discussion of the relationship of wage garnishment to job loss, see Kerr, Wage
Garnishment Should Be Prohibited, 2 PROSPEcrus 371 (1969).
9. Hearings pt. I, at 104 (comment by Representative Frank Annunzio):
I would also like to point out to you • • • the untold thousands-millions, I'll
go that far-of dollars it is costing the local governments, local courts • • • , the
judges that have to be paid, the process servers, the bailiffs, bringing these people
before the court, having government take a part in settling these credit problems
is a very, very costly procedure.
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and the theory that the availability of the garnishment remedy
promotes improvident extension of credit on irresistible terms to
people who are unable to repay voluntarily.10 Those arguing against
abolition maintained that the beneficial aspects of easy credit out,
weigh the evils11 and that wage garnishment is necessary to protect
the creditor.12 The garnishment provision finally enacted into law
was a compromise measure. It exempts a minimum of seventy-five
per cent of the debtor's wages from gamishment,13 and it prohibits
an employer from discharging an employee whose wages have been
garnished to satisfy any single debt. 14
This modest provision was the extent of congressional efforts to
effect national reform of wage garnishment laws when the Supreme
10. In this regard, Representative Leonor Sullivan has commented:
May I say ••• that this is a part of the reason why a prohibition of garnish•
ment of wages is in this bill-to make the seller just a little more careful about
the kind of credit they give to people who have great desires but not the financial
ability to fulfill these desires by paying for them. If they can buy what they desire
so easily without worrying about liow to repay then it is enticing them into buy•
ing something which they are too weak to resist.
Hearings pt. 1, at 195.
But a law of this kind on garnishment might have some effect with those who
give too freely of this easy credit, and make it possible for those of us who do
pay our bills to pay lower prices and not to have to continue to pay prices which
make up the debts of those who are just buying and using and never paying.
Hearings pt. 1, at 264. Robert C. Weaver, Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop•
ment, quoted a statement on this point from the Governor's Report on the Los Angeles
riot:
Another problem is "easy credit" which can become harsh indeed if the dis•
advantaged person defaults on his installment obligations. The debtor may ex•
perience the loss of his property through repossesion, or the loss of his job through
repeated garnishments of his wages. While it is easy to say that the improvident
debtor brought this state upon himself, we deplore the tactics of some merchants
and lenders who help induce low-income persons to become heavily debt-bur•
dened.
Hearings pt. 1, at 302, •
11. Hearings pt. 1, at 278 (statement of Robert C. Moot, Administrator, Small
Business Administration):
Credit purchasing • • • is good for our economy and it is good for the purchaser, particularly those with moderate or low incomes. Credit makes it possible
for these people to own and enjoy the increasing variety of products and services
supplied by our free enterprise system, products and services designed to make
life easier and more bountiful.
12. Hearings pt. 1, at 279 (statement of Robert C. Moot, Administrator, Small Busi•
ness Administration): "Garnishment is very often the only legitimate means available
to a businessman for final satisfaction of debts due him."
13. The Consumer Credit Protection Act § 16'73, 15 U.S.C. § 16'7S (Supp. IV, 1965•
1968) (effective July 1, 1970), provides that garnishment may reach the lesser of 25% of the
debtor's weekly disposable earnings or the amount by which his weekly earnings ex•
ceed thirty times the current federal minimum wage.
14. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 1674, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (Supp. IV, 1965•1968)
(effective July I, 19'70), provides:
(a) No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his
earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.
(b) Whoever wilfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not
more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
This provision may prove largely ineffective, since it provides no protection for the
employee who has previously had his wages garnished for a seperate debt.
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Court, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 15 handed down
a decision which greatly accelerated the reform process. In
Sniadach, a finance company, acting in accordance with Wisconsin
law,16 had initiated garnishment proceedings in the circuit court for
Milwaukee County against a debtor and against her employer as
garnishee, alleging a claim of $420 on a promissory note. Pursuant
to the procedure established by state statute,17 the garnishee answered that he held $63.18 in wages owed to the debtor and that he
would pay half of that sum to her and retain the other half subject
to the order of the court. The debtor, who had been served with a
summons and a copy of the complaint on the same day as the garnishee,18 moved for dismissal of the garnishment proceedings, alleging
that the Wisconsin procedure violated her right to due process of
law, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, by failing to provide her with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
seizure of her wages. The county court rejected that contention and
held that the Wisconsin statute was constitutional; the Wisconsin
supreme court affirmed that decision.19 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Wisconsin supreme court and
held that "the interim freezing of wages without a chance to be
heard violates procedural due process."20
The question of the constitutionality of prejudgment wage
garnishment had never before reached the Supreme Court, although
15. 395 U.S. 337 (1969), noted in 1969 DUKE L.J. 1285 and 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 750
(1969).
16. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1969).
17. WIS. STAT, ANN. § 267.11(6) (Supp. 1969) provides:
[I]f the garnishee is indebted to or under any liability to the defendant for wages
or salary, the garnishee answer shall state"the amount of the subsistence allowance
paid over or to be paid over to the principal defendant and the balance held by
the garnishee.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.18(12)(a) (Supp. 1969) provides for a subsistence allowance:
When wages or salary are the subject of garnishment action, the garnishee
shall pay over to the principal defendant on the date when such wages or salary
would normally be payable a subsistence allowance, out of the wages or salary then
owing, in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual without dependents or $40
in the case of an individual with dependents: but in no event in excess of 50 percent of the wages or salary owing. Said subsistence shall be applied to the first
wages or salary earned in the period subject to garnishment action.
18. WIS. STAT, ANN, § 267.07 (Supp. 1969) allows a plaintiff ten days after service
on the garnishee within which to serve the principal defendant with notice of such
service.
19. Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W,2d 259 (1967).
20. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) (emphasis added). However, the Court left unanswered
the question whether the required prior hearing must be a full trial culminating in
judgment or whether a hearing with fewer procedural safeguards is sufficient. Although
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion contains language which might suggest the latter,
it seems more consistent with the majority opinion that a full trial is required. See
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 115 (1969). Indeed, a hearing
without full procedural safeguards cannot be effective to protect a debtor's rights
unless the creditor's claim can be clearly seen as frivolous.

Michigan Law Review

990

[Vol. 68

in McKay v. Mclnnes, 21 a 1929 memorandum decision, the Court
had upheld a statute providing for prejudgment attachment. 22
McKay, which was cited as controlling by the Wisconsin court in its
disposition of the constitutional argument in Sniadach, 23 involved
an attachment of realty and stock to satisfy a debt. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court in Sniadach, distinguished that case from one
involving wage garnishment with the statement that "[a] procedural
rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general ... does
not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case."24 The
Sniadach Court's refusal to apply the holding of McKay to a case
involving wage garnishment suggests that the Court may be in the
process of re-evaluating the entire area of prejudgment attachment
and garnishment. In addition, the Sniadach decision may have implications for other areas of law which concern the poor debtor. This
Note will analyze the foundations, express and implied, of the
Court's wage garnishment decision, and it will suggest possible applications of that decision to other problems.

I.

SNIADACH AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW

It is generally accepted as fundamental to procedural due process
that a person be afforded "notice and an opportunity to be heard"
before he may be deprived of life, liberty, or property.25 Although
21. 279 U.S. 820.
22. In McKay, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine which had also upheld the statute. Mdnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A.
699 (1928). The Court did so on the basis of Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921),
in which the prejudgment attachment of the property of an out-of-state defendant
had been upheld even though the attachment statute required the defendant to post
security in order fo defend the action, and on the basis of Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277
U.S. 29 (1928), which had sustained the prejudgment attachment of property of stockholders in an insolvent bank. These cases may be distinguished from Sniadach because
of the uniqueness of wages. Moreover, those cases were decided forty years ago, before
the concept of due process had reached its present level of development.
23. 37 Wis. 2d at 169, 154 N.W.2d at 262. The Wisconsin supreme court also
refused to consider many of the alleged constitutional defects with a potential for
producing injustice, because petitioner herself had shown no hardship.
24. 395 U.S. at 340.
25. The Supreme Court relied on this principle at least as early as 1863 when, in
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 233, it held that a discharge under a state insolvency
law was ineffective against an out-of-state creditor: "Parties whose rights are to be affected
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must be notified. Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or
property without notice and an opportunity to make his defence." 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
at 233. Since that time, notice and an opportunity for a hearing have frequently been
held to be fundamental requirements of procedural due process. Anderson Natl.
Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944): "The fundamental requirement of due
process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the rights for which the constitutional protection is invoked."
Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 (1963): "Due process • • •
implies notice and a hearing." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 8: Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950): "[I]he Due Process Clause ••• at a minimum ••• require[s] that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."
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the Supreme Court has occasionally sustained a conditional prejudgment deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, pending
the outcome of the case, it has usually done so only in cases involving
some compelling governmental interest, such as safeguarding national
security,26 protecting public health,27 or maintaining economic
stability.28 Most of the recent cases involving notice and hearing
requirements have not disputed the general proposition that the
opportunity for a hearing is essential.29 In the few cases in which the
requirement for a hearing has itself been questioned, the determinative issue has most often been whether or not there was a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. 30
With regard to prejudgment attachment, the last time prior to
Sniadach that the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of such a procedure was forty years ago, and at that time it summarily rejected the argument that prejudgment attachment results
in a denial of procedural due process.31 In Coffin Brothers v. Ben26. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961),
the Court held valid the summary discharge of a cafeteria employee in a Navy munitions factory.
27. In Ewing v. Mytinger &: Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), the Court upheld
§ 304(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1964), allowing seizure of misbranded articles without a prior hearing.
28. In Fahey v. Mallonee, 33 U.S. 245 (1947), the Court held constitutional § 5(d)
of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, § 5(d), 48 Stat. 132, as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1964). That section authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
to prescribe by regulation the terms and conditions upon which a conservator may be
appointed to take possession of a federal savings and loan association prior to the
statutory hearing. See also Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), in which the
Court upheld a Georgia statute allowing the establishment of prejudgment liens on
the property of stockholders of insolvent banks.
29. With regard to notice, see, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208
(1962): Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Both of
these cases held that notice by publication is inadequate when the names and addresses
of interested parties are known. 'With regard to the opportunity to be heard, see, e.g.,
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), in which the petitioner was not given notice
of proceedings initiated by his former wife and her husband for the adoption of the
petitioner's son. When the adoption proceedings were successful, the petitioner moved
to annul the adoption, but his motion was rejected by the lower court. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the hearing on this motion was inadequate, since the
petitioner was forced to assume burdens of proof which, had he been accorded notice
in the adoption proceedings, would have been borne by the opposing parties. See also
Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965): "The right to be heard must necessarily
embody a right to file motions and pleadings essential to present claims and raise relevant issues.''
30. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), which held that the right
to future social security benefits is not a property right protected by the due process
clause; English v. English, 117 S.2d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960), which held that
the right to accrued but unpaid alimony is a property right protected by the due
process clause; Siegal! v. Solomon, 19 III. 2d 145, 166 N.E.2d 5 (1960), which held that
the rights of a husband to his wife's society and affections are not "property" rights
protected by the due process clause from state control.
31. The Court in the 1920's upheld prejudgment attachment in three cases: Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); and
McKay v. Mcinnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929). See note 22 supra.
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nett, for example, Justice Holmes disposed of that argument by
noting that "nothing is more common than to allow parties alleging
themselves to be creditors to establish in advance by attachment a
lien dependent for its effect upon the result of the suit,"32 In the
years during which the Supreme Court remained silent on the issue
of the constitutionality of prejudgment attachment and garnishment
procedures, state courts were faced with the problem of reconciling
the decision that such procedures do not deny due process with the
general notion that procedural due process requires notice and an
opportunity for a hearing. One approach employed to uphold prejudgment attachments and garnishments was to assume that no interest protected by the due process clause is involved in prejudgment
attachment procedures since such procedures deprive a defendant
merely of the possession or use of his property pending the outcome
of the litigation, and to conclude that therefore the defendant is
technically not deprived of any "property" without an opportunity
to be heard. 33 A second theory recognized that the use of property
constitutes a protected property right, but concluded that since attachment only temporarily withdraws that right, the procedure does
not result in a "deprivation" within the meaning of the due process
clause.34 Neither of these attempts to rationalize the decision to up
hold prejudgment attachment procedures is very persuasive, since,
in the context of other issues involving the due process clause, the
use of property has long been recognized as a property right protected by the Constitution from even temporary deprivation.35 How32. 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).
33. An example of the language commonly used comes from a foreign attachment
case, Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932), in which the court stated:
"In the meantime there has been no deprivation of property. The attachment, quasi
[in] rem in nature, has operated only to detain the property temporarily, to await final
judgment." 112 W. Va. at 198, 163 S.E, at 848.
34. In Mcinnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), the court applied this
rationale:
The legal right to use and derive a profit from land or other things is prop•
erty. , • . And the power of disposition at the will of the owner is property.
Deprivation does not require actual physical taking of the property or the thing
itself. It takes place when the free use and enjoyment of the thing or the power
to dispose of it at will are affected.
But, although an attachment may, within the broad meaning of the preceding
definition, deprive one of property, yet conditional and temporary as 1t is, and
part of the legal remedy and procedure by which the property of a debtor may
be taken in satisfaction of the debt, if judgment be recovered, we do not think
it is the deprivation of property contemplated by the Constitution.
In a more recent case, Shell Oil Co. v, Milne, 246 A.2d 837 (Vt. 1968), the court
expressly invoked both this reasoning and that of Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163
S.E. 845 (1932), discussed in note 33 supra.
35. In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), for example, the Supreme Court
held that low and regular flights of government aircraft over a chicken farm, which
rendered the land useless, constituted a taking for which the owner must be compensated under the fifth amendment, The Court considered the fact that the taking
may have been only temporary, relevant solely for the purpose of determining the
damages and not for the purpose of determining whether or not there had actually
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ever they sought to rationalize their decisions, state courts may in
fact have upheld the constitutionality of prejudgment attachment and
garnishment procedures largely on the basis of the Supreme Court's
recognition of the traditional acceptance of those procedures.36 In
Sniadach, however, the Supreme Court recognized that, because of
vast changes in the American economy, rules which were developed
years ago to govern a broad range of attachments are inappropriate
for the special category of wage garnishments. Thus, the fact that
there was precedent for upholding the constitutionality of prejudgment attachments did not dictate the decision of the case.37
In addition to refusing to uphold prejudgment wage garnishment on the ground that attachment is an historically accepted procedure, the Sniadach Court considered and rejected other grounds
on which wage garnishment might have been upheld. As stated
previously, the prejudgment deprivation of property can normally
be sustained if such deprivation is necessary to protect a vital governmental interest, or if the court finds that the procedure involved
does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
right. 38 Both Douglas' majority opinion and Harlan's concurrence
rejected any applicability of the first theory.39 The Court saw nothing in prejudgment wage garnishment "requiring special protection
for a state or creditor interest."40 The second theory, however, received more extensive consideration, resulting in a determination
that prejudgment wage garnishment does deprive the debtor of his
constitutionally protected right to property and thus requires adherence to standards of procedural due process.
After defining the interest of which the garnishment defendant
is deprived as "his enjoyment of earned wages," the Court conbeen a taking. In Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), the Court declared
similar action by a state to be a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court has also held that an unreasonable restraint on the
use of property imposed by a zoning ordinance may be repugnant to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
36. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
37. 395 U.S, at 340: "The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal
regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modem forms."
For an account of the origins of attachment procedures, see G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 64 (rev. ed. 1940). See also Levy, Mesne Process in
Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52 (1968).
38, See notes 25·30 5upra and accompanying text.
39, Justice Douglas stated that "[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the
requirements of due process in extraordinary situations." 395 U.S. at 339. Similarly,
Justice Harlan stated: "Apart from special situations ••. , I think that due process
is afforded only by ••• 'notice' and 'hearing' ••• before [one] can be deprived of his
property or its unrestricted use." 395 U.S. at 343.
40. 395 U.S. at 339. It is not clear what kind of "special creditor interest" would
be so compelling as to validate garnishment without the necessity of balancing opposing
private debtor interests as well. See notes 26-28 supra and notes 51-56 infra and
accompanying text.
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sidered in detail the problem of wages, "a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system."41
Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas stated that the use of
wages must be protected by the due process clause because there
are "grave injustices made possible by prejudgment garnishment
whereby the sole opportunity to be heard comes after the taking." 42
He concluded that, since the result of prejudgment wage garnishment is often the loss of employment,43 forced bankruptcy,44 or the
coerced payment of false or inflated claims,45 the "procedure violates
the fundamental principles of due process."46 The Court thus relied
on the substantive evils resulting from wage garnishment as a basis
for its determination that prejudgment wage garnishment cannot
constitutionally be tolerated. 47
The majority opinion, however, left several of the underlying
assumptions of the decision unclear. It failed, for example, to explain fully how the temporary denial of the use of wages constitutes
a deprivation of property for purposes of the due process clause. In
addition, it does not seem to have applied the balancing test normally used in cases in which the issue is whether there has been a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right so that notice and
an opportunity for a hearing are required. 48 Rather, the Court
focused entirely on the individual's interest in obtaining his wages
without delay and ignored the public interests favoring prejudg41. 395 U.S. at 340.
42. 395 U.S. at 340.
43. See note 8 supra.
44. See note 7 supra.
45. Project, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L.
REV. 743, 753 (1968):
The debtor whose wages are tied up by a writ of garnishment, and who is
usually in need of money, is in no position to resist demands for collection fees.
If the debt is small, the debtor will be under considerable pressure to pay the debt
and collection charges in order to get his wages back. If the debt is large, he will
often sign a new contract or "payment schedule" which incorporates these additional charges.
46. 395 U.S. at 342.
47. It must be remembered that the holding of Sniadach struck down only that
wage garnishment which occurs prior to a hearing. While the creditor is thus denied
the ability to exert pressure on the defendant prior to trial on the merits, he may
still have available his postjudgment remedies. Indeed, postjudgment wage garnishment was upheld in Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed
per curiam, 395 U.S. 825 (1969). The use of postjudgment garnishment by a creditor
may in some circumstances render Sniadach's prohibition of prejudgment garnishment
nugatory. If, for example, the creditor uses a device by which the debtor never gets
notice of the hearing and thus loses the judgment by default (see note Ill infra and
accompanying text), then that creditor can garnish the debtor's wages through a postjudgment garnishment without ever confronting the debtor and yet without violating
the principles established in Sniadach. It is argnable that such deprivation of a debtor's
funds without his having a meaningful hearing comes within the prohibition of
Sniadach. See note 95 infra.
48. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
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ment wage garnishment. The Court thus failed to articulate fully
the theoretical bases for its decision. Yet those bases must be understood before the impact of Sniadach can be accurately gauged.
Although the Court based its holding on the distinct character
of wages, it failed to elucidate fully why the immediate enjoyment
of wages merits protection by full due process guarantees. As noted
previously, the use of property has been recognized in other contexts
as a property right protected by the Constitution from even temporary deprivation;rn Similarly, when the property involved is wages,
there are persuasive reasons for concluding that the deprivation of
the use of such property pending the outcome of a lawsuit results in
the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. The primary
value of wages lies in the ability of the wage earner to exchange
them for goods and services. To the many families that are dependent upon the immediate use of wages to buy the staples of everyday
life, a temporary "freezing" of those funds strips them of much of
their value. Loss of the ability to purchase necessities for one week
is not wholly counterbalanced by double buying power in some
week thereafter. 50 Economic realities, then, compel the conclusion
that depriving a person of the use of his wages, even temporarily,
constitutes a deprivation of a significant, if quantitatively elusive,
property right.
In previous cases in which the hearing requirement has been
questioned and the determinative issue has been whether or not
there was a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, the
courts have usually employed a balancing test to weigh countervailing public and private interests. 51 The Court in Sniadach, however,
49, See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
50. Even though most families can obtain necessities without cash by means of
credit arrangements of various kinds, the argument advanced in the text retains its
force. There will always be a group of wage-earning families with a credit rating so
poor that no credit at all is available. Moreover, many other families will have already
reached the limit of credit available to them. Indeed, for the wage-earner whose
wages are a likely target of garnishment, credit will be necessarily limited. The plight
of the defendant in a wage garnishment case may be more easily understood through
an illustration. Assume that a spurious claim is brought. Assume further that the
defendant must forgo, instead of half of his wages, half of the goods and services for
which he normally exchanges them. What can he do without: housing? groceries?
transportation? Surely it is not unrealistic to assume that a significant number of
wage earners-particularly those most susceptible to wage garnishment-have their
entire paychecks budgeted in advance. If these goods and services are not made available to the defendant until months later when his claim is vindicated, they will
hardly be of equal value.
51. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 8ll (2d Cir. 1967) (expulsion of
cadet from Merchant Marine Academy requires a fair hearing): "to determine in any
given case what procedures due process requires, the court must carefully determine
and balance the nature of the private interest affected and the government interest involved ••••" Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959): "Application of the broad
restraints of due process compels inquiry into the nature of the demand being made
upon indMdual freedom in a particular context and the justification of social need
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appears to have avoided such a balancing test. The Court thus ignored the public interests that may be served by prejudgment wage
garnishment, that is, the interest in ensuring that valid claims will
be collectible and the interest in promoting the extension of credit.
The public interest in ensuring the collectibility of debts is evidenced by the many statutes and rules providing creditors' remedies52 and by the court facilities and personnel provided by public
funds to enforce creditors' claims against their debtors. 53 In fact,
many statutes authorize prejudgment attachment specifically in
order to prevent a debtor from transferring his property, with intent
to defraud creditors, during the pendency of litigation to collect a
debt. 5.t It is argued that permitting wages to be garnished prior to a
in which the demand rests." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 14 (1965): "The requirements
of due process are a function not only of the extent of the governmental restriction
imposed, but also of the extent of the necessity for the restriction," See also Finfer v.
Caplin, 344 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1965). The decisions have often relied on the language
of Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGr.ith, 341 U.S. 123, 163
(1951) (concurring opinion):
Due process is ••. a delicate process of adjustment , •••
• • • The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives
to the procedure that was followed ••• , the balance of hurt complained of and
good accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the
judicial judgment.
E.g., Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(cafeteria cook in Navy munitions plant not denied due process when required to
turn in her security badge without a hearing): Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
29¾ F,2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961) (expulsion of students from state university without
a hearing held a violation of due process clause).
52. Statutes and rules provide numerous devices besides attachment and garnish•
ment procedures to facilitate the collection of claims, All states, of course, provide
procedures for execution against the debtor's property to satisfy claims that have been
reduced to judgment. E.g., PA, R. Crv. PRo. 3101-215. In addition, the default provisions of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code permit creditors secured by
personal property to repossess and to liquidate their interests in the collateral without
judgment upon the debtor's default. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-501 to -507. A
number of states also permit devices such as the cognovit note, in which any attorney
is authorized to appear on the debtor's behalf to confess judgment against him. E.g.,
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMN., CREDITOR-DEBTOR LAws IN OHIO 11-13 (1959). See also
CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS (J. McKnight ed. 1963). Although there are additional
policies underlying the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-500 (1964), that Act
also manifests a policy of maximizing the size of the estate available for distribution
to general creditors. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67, 70c, 70e, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107, llO(c),
llO(e) (1964), as amended, 11 U.$.C. §§ 107, llO(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
53, See note 9 supra,
54. See
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 67 (rev. ed. 1940).
One sample statute is in force in Michigan:
The circuit courts of the state shall have the power by attachment to apply
to the satisfaction of a claim due or to become due any interest in things which
are subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state and belonging to the :person
against whom the claim is asserted whether or not the person himself is subject to
the judicial jurisdiction of the state. The courts may exercise the jurisdiction granted
in this section only if action is taken in accordance with court rules promulgated
to protect the parties and it is asserted that I or more of the following situations
exists:

o.
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hearing prevents the debtor from defrauding his creditor, because it
keeps the debtor from dissipating the fund which may ultimately be
used to satisfy the debt. Recent studies, however, have challenged
the thesis that wage garnishment is an effective means of promoting
the collectibility of claims. Figures for collection agencies show that
"[i]n New York where the creditor can only garnishee 10% of a
man's wages, or New Jersey or Nebraska where he is limited to 20%
there is a higher percentage of recovery of debts than in California
where the creditor can get 50% . . . ." 55 The public also has an
interest in promoting the easy availability of consumer credit, since
that availability helps the economy to expand and at the same time
allows consumers to enjoy a standard of living that would otherwise
be unattainable. The enhancement of economic growth and material
comfort may come at too high a cost, however, if the availability of
a facile collection device encourages extension of credit to persons
unable to pay and destined therefore to suffer garnishment with its
often tragic consequences. For these reasons, it appears likely that,
even if the Court had applied a balancing test in Sniadach, it would
have found that the public interests were outweighed by the "grave
injustices"56 resulting from prejudgment wage garnishment.
Nevertheless, the Court can be criticized for its failure even to
discuss the relative weight of the public interests. The most probable explanation for that failure is that the Court decided that the
well-documented effects of wage garnishment made application of
the usual balancing standard unnecessary, even though some legitimate public interests may be advanced by prejudgment wage garnishment. The Court seemed to feel that the substantive "evils" resulting from wage garnishment are so clear and so likely to occur
(1) that the defendant has absconded or is about to abscond from the state or
is concealed therein to the injury of his creditors;
(2) that the defendant has assigned, disposed of, or concealed any of his property with intent to defraud his creditors;
(3) that the defendant is about to assign, dispose of, or conceal any of his
property with intent to defraud his creditors;
(4) that the defendant has removed or is about to remove any of his property
from the state with intent to defraud his creditors;
(5) that the defendant has fraudulently contracted the debt or fraudulently
incurred the obligation respecting which the suit is brought;
(6) that the defendant is not a resident of the state and has not resided therein
for 3 months immediately preceding;
(7) that the defendant is a foreign corporation.
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.401 (1968).
55. Friedman, The Repossessed, NEW REPUBLIC, April 27, 1968, at 10. This data can
be misleading, however, since it focuses only on collection agencies, with no explanation of the extent to which they use garnishment, See also Brunn, Wage Garnishment
in California: A. Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 1214, 1236-42 (1965).
Brunn attempts to show that consumer lending is unrelated to the availability of
garnishment. But his assumptions and conclusions are questioned by Homer Kripke,
who argues that the public is not in a better position without prejudgment remedies.
See Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U, L. R.Ev. I (1969),

56. 895

u .s.

at 340,
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that balancing was not required. But that feeling was itself highly
subjective and required an implicit weighing of interests on the part
of the Court. As Justice Black argued in his dissenting opinion in
Sniadach, the Court seems to have been acting as a superlegislature
in striking down prejudgment wage garnishment on account of its
bad effects.67 Indeed, the majority opinion does appear to be quite
heavily underscored by a value judgment concerning the impropriety of such garnishment. Thus, it is arguable that, while the
Court claimed to base its decision solely on grounds of a denial of
procedural due process, it was also motivated by the old concept of
substantive due process.
The principal contribution of Sniadach, then, seems to lie in its
recognition that a temporary deprivation of the use of property may
be prohibited by the due process clause even when the deprivation
will be brief and the debtor will eventually receive a hearing on the
merits. 68 In the remainder of this Note, that constitutional concept
will be discussed in terms of its implications for four areas of the
law: other forms of prejudgment attachment and garnishment, procedural rules that discriminate against poor litigants, the doctrine
of relievable duress, and postjudgment garnishment.

II.

IMPLICATIONS OF SNIADACH FOR OTHER FORMS OF
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT

The Court's emphasis in Sniadach on the well-proved evils resulting peculiarly from wage garnishment raises the question how it
will treat other types of prejudgment attachment and garnishment.
Clearly it cannot ignore them completely and return, without explanation, to the pre-Sniadach position that all attachments and
57. 395 U.S. at 344-50. Justice Black stated:
[T]he Court •.. strikes down this state law ••• because it considers a garnishment
law of this kind to be bad state policy, a judgment I think the state legislature,
not this Court, has power to make.
395 U.S. at 344.
The Wisconsin law is simply nullified by this Court as though the Court had
been granted a super-legislative power to step in and frustrate policies of States
adopted by their own elected legislatures. The Court thus steps back into the
due process philosophy which brought on President Roosevelt's Court fight. Argu•
ments can be made for outlawing loan sharks and installment sales companies but
such decisions, I think, should be made by state and federal legislators, and not by
this Court.
395 U.S. at 345.
In the first sentence of the argument in her brief, petitioner urges that this Wis•
consin law "is contrary to public policy"; the Court apparently finds that a
sufficient basis for holding it unconstitutional. This holding savors too much of
the "Natural Law," "Due Process," "Shock-the-conscience" test of what is con•
stitutional for me to agree to the decision.
395 U.S. at 350.
58. Of course in situations not involving attachment, the courts have long recognized that the due process clause protects against deprivation of the use of prop•
erty as well as of the ownership of the property itself. See note 35 supra.
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garnishments unrelated to wages are permissible; 59 such a course of
action would be precluded by the Court's recognition in Sniadach
that the historical acceptance of attachment procedures will no
longer suffice to support the conclusion that those procedures comply with the due process clause. On the other hand, it is unlikely
that the Court will act against other forms of attachment and
garnishment with the same one-sided, summary method which it
employed in Sniadach. There are no comparable data demonstrating
the adverse effects of those procedures, and any data that could be
assembled would probably have less emotional impact.60 Indeed, the
majority opinion in Sniadach spoke of wages as a "specialized" form
of property. 61 Thus, the best prediction seems to be that the Court
will use the normal due process balancing test in order to determine
whether the temporary deprivation in the particular case amounts
to a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property right and
thus will not be allowed prior to a hearing. That approach, it is
submitted, is the most desirable, since it recognizes the important
rationale of Sniadach that a temporary denial of the use of property
during the pendency of a civil action may be a deprivation forbidden by the Constitution, and since at the same time it avoids a subjective judgment, such as that apparently made in Sniadach, that the
gravity of the deprivation is so clear as to obviate the need for consideration of the public interests.
In evaluating due process arguments concerning other attachment and garnishment procedures, it is helpful to separate the
various forms of prejudgment seizures into three major categories:
attachment or garnishment of tangible real and personal property,
garnishment of intangibles, and foreign attachment.
In general, prejudgment attachment is a creditor's remedy involving seizure of the alleged debtor's property prior to adjudication
of the creditor's claim on the merits. 62 The chief public interests in
favor of summary seizure of tangible real and personal property are
those discussed above with regard to wages-to promote the extension of credit and to ensure a fund from which to collect valid
claims-although these interests must be offset by the public interests in favor of the debtor. 63 In order for a court to hold that pre59. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
60. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, apparently believes that all prejudgment
deprivations are unconstitutional. See note 39 supra. The Wisconsin supreme court
appears to agree, at least partially, with Harlan, for it has held a prejudgment deprivation other than that of wages unconstitutional. Larson v. Fetherston, 172 N.W.2d
20 (Wis. 1969). See note 75 infra. But see note 64 infra and text accompanying notes
63-89 infra.
61. 395 U.S. at 340.
62. H. 0LECK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS 2 (1948).
63. See text accompanying notes 51-56 supra.
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judgment attachment of tangible property unconstitutionally
deprives a defendant of a protected property interest, the court must
be persuaded that the alleged debtor's interests outweigh the substantial public concerns supporting seizure. 64 Since the relative
strength of the public interests in the summary procedure and that
of the individual interests infringed differ for various types of attachment, the opposing interests are best evaluated by analyzing
separately the attachment of realty, the attachment of personalty,
and the garnishment of personalty.
Prejudgment attachment of realty and immovable personal
property should raise no serious constitutional question. Since generally prevalent procedures do not involve the dispossession of the
owner of the attached property prior to adjudication, this type of
attachment does not deprive him of the property's beneficial use
until there has been a hearing on the merits. It merely places on
the property a lien which restricts that property's alienability.65
Moreover, except in extraordinary circumstances, the temporary
loss of the right to sell or encumber one's land free from a creditor's
inchoate lien is a deprivation of only a fraction of the value of the
land.66 On the other hand, the public interest favoring the prejudgment attachment of realty is quite strong. Indeed, there is often
justification for the fear that, absent prejudgment attachment, a
debtor may transfer his land without consideration, hoping to make
himself judgment proof and thus to leave the creditor to absorb the
debt without a remedy. 67 Attachment of realty therefore usually
amounts to only a slight inconvenience to the debtor, and that
nominal infringement of his interest should not outweigh the public
interest in promoting the collectibility of accounts.
Prejudgment attachment of movable personal property, however,
64. At least one court has indicated its unwillingness to determine the question of
the constitutionality of attachment and garnishment procedures in the absence of the
specific factual context of a particular case. Although the Supreme Court of California
has held in two cases that California's prejudgment wage garnishment procedures do not
comply with the requirements of procedural due process [Cline v. Credit Bureau, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 669, 464 P .2d 125 (1970); McCallop v. Carberry, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122
(1970)], it has refused to decide a case in which the attorney general of the state sought
to have all prejudgment attachments declared unconstitutional. The court held that since
the case presented neither a party in interest nor a concrete set of facts, the attorney gen•
eral's complaint constituted a request for an advisory opinion, which the court does not
have jurisdiction to render. People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. Rptr.
670, 464 P .2d 126 (1970). See notes 73, 88 infra.
65. C. NADLER, CREDITOR AND DEBTOR RELATIONS 77 (1956).
66. One exception might be the case of the attachment defendant who is a real
estate dealer.
67. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. If a conveyance is made by a debtor to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, they may avoid it. But by fraudulently conveying his
property, the debtor may harass his creditors and increase the cost of collecting their
debts. See generally G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 58-62b, at
79-103 (1940).
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ordinarily results in immediate seizure and removal by an officer of
the court. 68 The individual thus loses possession and all beneficial
use of his property prior to adjudication. I£ the personalty is of
everyday importance, such as a piece of furniture, an appliance, or
an automobile, the individual may suffer substantial injury when he
is deprived of its use. 69 Moreover, the public interest in ensuring
that a fund is available for collection purposes is only slightly advanced by allowing attachment of personalty prior to adjudication,
since a defendant would seldom be moved to transfer a necessity in
order to defraud a creditor.70 Therefore, at least when the use of the
attached personalty is of everyday importance, the interests of the
alleged debtor should prevail, and a hearing should be required
prior to attachment.
Prejudgment garnishment is a specialized form of attachment
that may be used to reach tangible personal property owned by the
defendant but in the possession of a third party, as well as to reach
debts owed to a defendant by a third party.71 Garnishment of tangible property normally should not affect a debtor's interest, since
the possession and beneficial use of the property involved are in the
third party and the alleged debtor is deprived only of his right to
alienate the property.72 That restriction on alienation is necessary
to protect the public interest in ensuring a collectible fund, since
the defendant who is not using his property may be presumed more
68. See C. NADLER, supra note 65, at 77.
69. This discussion, of course, applies only to consumers, and not to businesses
or corporations whose assets might be attached. The hardship recognized in Sniadach
is the temporary loss of the necessities of life; corporations, while technically persons,
do not eat or require the use of consumer goods for their existence. Moreover, this
discussion does not apply with regard to property of the debtor which is exempt from
attachment. For a discussion of state exemption statutes, see Karlen, Exemptions from
Execution, 22 Bus. LAw. 1167 (1967).
70. In certain circumstances, it may be possible for a debtor to transfer title to a
necessity while retaining the use of the property. A debtor might, for example, transfer title to his automobile to a relative without forgoing either possession or use of
the car. Similarly, certain appliances might be transferred to a relative or friend
living nearby with the understanding that the debtor could continue to use the
property. Except in cases such as these, however, it is unlikely that the debtor would
transfer a necessity in order to defraud his creditor. If a debtor should fraudulently
transfer such property, creditors may, of course, avoid the transfer (see note 67 supra),
although they are much less likely to discover a transfer of movable personal property
than a transfer of real property.
71. H. OLECK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS 3 (1948).
72. This analysis becomes somewhat more complicated if the defendant, at the
time of garnishment, retains the right to recover his property on demand from the
third party. In that situation, the garnishment denies the defendant that right as well
as the power to alienate. Since the defendant would, except for the garnishment, be
able to recover and enjoy full use and possession of his property, he is placed in much
the same situation by garnishment as he would be by an attachment suit in which no
third party is involved. The validity of attachment of tangible property has been
discussed previously, in the text accompanying notes 65-70 supra, and the same conclusions should apply to garnishment in this special situation.
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likely to transfer it to defraud his creditors than would a defendant
who is actually using the property. Thus the public interest should
prevail and garnishment of tangible personal property in the hands
of a bailee should be allowed prior to adjudication.
In summary, attachment or garnishment of tangible property
prior to a hearing should generally be found to be violative of the
due process clause only when the property of which the owner is
temporarily deprived is property that is important to daily life. It
seems that these conditions would be fulfilled solely when movable
personal property is attached. 73
A second general category of prejudgment seizure is that of the
garnishment of intangible assets-that is, the attachment of funds
which are in the possession of a third party, but which are allegedly
owed to the defendant. Wages owed to a defendant are one such type
of funds; Sniadach established the proposition that a defendant may
be deprived of the use of his wages only after he has been adjudged
liable for a debt. 74 Other funds may invoke considerations similar to
those in Sniadach if the defendant has both the expectation of
prompt receipt of the money and an immediate need for it-such
as when he has no other income. Examples of such funds are a J?ank
account and the income from a life trust. Sniadach should be controlling in a case in which such funds are the defendant's sole or primary liquid assets and are garnished prior to a hearing. In such a
case, the defendant's significant interest in the use of the funds-an
interest which is analogous to the wage earner's interest in the use
of his wages-is not outweighed by the public interests in debt collection and in economic expansion. 75
For the more common type of garnishable debt or chose in action, however, the defendant's interest in the use of the garnished
fund seems to be relatively slight. For example, a defendant with
73. But see text accompanying note 88 infra. If courts in particular jurisdictions
are unwilling to undertake the burdensome factual examinations necessary to define
the parameters of due process in the attachment or garnishment context (see note 64
supra), the legislatures might solve the problem by enacting realistic exemption
statutes to cover exceptional or hardship situations. See note 89 infra and accompanying text. But see note 78 infra.
74. The supreme courts of Arizona and California have recently held, on the basis
of Sniadach, that prejudgment wage garnishment is unconstitutional. Tennplan, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 463 P .2d 68 (Ariz. 1969); Cline v. Credit Bureau, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669,
464 P.2d 125 (1970); McCallop v. Carberry, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122 (1970). In
Termplan, however, the court carefully limited its decision to the garnishment of wages.
75. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in a recent opinion based on Sniadach, held
unconstitutional the prejudgment garnishment of bank accounts. Larson v. Fether•
ston, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). The court included in its opinion dicta to the effect that
all prejudgment garnishments violate the due process clause: "We think that no valid
distinction can be made between garnishment of wages and that of other property."
172 N.W. at 23.
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accounts receivable which he neither needs76 nor expects to be paid
immediately has little cognizable interest in the "use" of those accounts-a use which is temporarily denied him by prejudgment
seizure. 77 Similarly, the defendant with a chose in action has no
substantial, immediate interest which is abridged by prejudgment
seizure. Moreover, the public interest in ensuring the existence of
a fund for debt collection seems strongest in cases in which the only
assets available for execution upon judgment are elusive cash funds.
Thus, in general, prejudgment garnishment of intangible assets
should not be held to deny a defendant due process of law except
when such a defendant has both an immediate expectation of, and
an immediate need for, the garnished fund. 78
The third general category of prejudgment attachments is that
involving the immediate seizure of a defendant's property for the
purpose of establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction when the defendant resides outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. Quasi in rem
jurisdiction extends to any attachable tangible or intangible property of the defendant which is located in the forum state,79 and in
most states, the defendant may make a personal appearance and still
limit such jurisdiction to the value of the property that is actually
attached. 80 Thus, in order to determine whether the due process
clause requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to
seizure in a foreign-attachment case, the same public and private
interests that are discussed above with regard to other kinds of attachment and garnishment should be weighed, 81 and the same balancing
process should apply. 82 It is also necessary, however, to determine
whether any considerations unique to foreign attachment should
alter the balance.
The chief public interests advanced in support of prejudgment
76. It should be reiterated here that for purposes of analysis in light of Sniadach,
the only need for funds which is constitutionally cognizable is a need for their use to
obtain necessities.
77. But see Arnold v. Knettle, 460 P.2d 45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969), in which the court,
relying on Sniadach, held that the garnishment both of wages and of accounts receivable
violates the due process clause.
78. It may be difficult to draft a statute to exclude garnishment in these exceptional situations. One solution may be to provide the defendant with notice at the
same time that it is provided to the garnishee, and to allow release of the garnished
funds upon defendant's sworn statement that he meets the criteria for the exception.
79. For the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction by means of the garnishment of a chose
in action, the "location" of such an intangible is any place at which the garnishee is
subject to in personam jurisdiction. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
80. See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 909, 948-55 (1960).
81. For a discussion of the competing considerations in cases which do not involve
foreign attachment, see text accompanying notes 62-78 supra.
82. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
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foreign attachment are the state's right to control controversies arising within its borders and the state's interest in providing the protection of state courts to its citizens in their dealings with nonresidents. 83
The use of prejudgment foreign-attachment procedures to achieve
these goals, however, has been severely criticized in light of modem
developments in the law relating to personal jurisdiction.84 The
critics contend that, since long-arm statutes make personal jurisdiction generally available in cases in which the nonresident defendant
has sufficient contacts within the forum state to create a genuine
state interest, quasi in rem jurisdiction established by prejudgment
foreign attachment is likely to be used only when the state has no
legitimate interest in the dispute. 85 If this criticism is valid, assertion
of jurisdiction by foreign attachment advances no state interests that
are not already fully protected. 86 Hence, the determination of the
constitutionality of various forms of prejudgment attachment and
garnishment should be unaffected by the fact that the attachment is
used to establish jurisdiction, at least if there are long-arm statutes
that make personal jurisdiction readily available.
In summary, the application of the Court's reasoning in Sniadach to other forms of prejudgment attachment and garnishment
should result in a finding of a denial of due process only in isolated
instances, such as those involving the attachment and removal of
personal property essential to the defendant, or those involving the
garnishment of intangible assets which the defendant needs in order
to purchase daily necessities. In analyzing the constitutionality of
the various forms of prejudgment attachment, however, it has been
necessary to deal in generalities rather than in specifics. Thus, the
resultant conclusions, while valid for most situations, may be invalid
83. Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction 1n Rem To Compel Payment of a Debt,
27 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1913). See also note 80 supra and note 84 infra.
84. See, e.g., Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76
HARV. L. REV. 303 (1962).
85. See, e.g., Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and
the Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550 (1967); Developments in the LawState Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960); Comment, Podolasky v. Devinney
and the Garnishment of Intangibles: A Chip Off the Old Balk, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426
(1968). An example of the results which can occur when foreign attachment is used to
gain jurisdiction in a place in which personal jurisdiction is unavailable is the .New
York rule of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966). The controversy in
that case involved an automobile crash in Vermont, with a Quebec resident as defendant. The New York court held that a New York liability insurer's obligation to
defend the action is a "debt" sufficient to assert foreign-attachment jurisdiction.
86. This conclusion depends on the existence of comprehensive long-arm statutes.
An example of the current trend in this direction can be found in California. Prior
to 1969 California had one of the least comprehensive long-arm statutes, permitting
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by California courts over only nonresident
motorists [CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17451 (West Supp. 1969)] and fliers [CAL. PUB, UTIL.
CODE § 21414 (West 1965)]. In 1969 the California legislature adopted a new statute
permitting personal jurisdiction in California whenever constitutional requirements
are satisfied. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 ('Vest 1969).
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in the extraordinary case. For example, although the attachment of
an automobile could cause severe hardship and thus require a full
hearing if the defendant had no alternative means of transportation
to and from work, the same type of attachment would be a mere
inconvenience and should not require a full hearing if the defendant
has a second car.
Since the normal manner in which one whose property has been
attached may raise objections based on the due process clause is
upon motion for dismissal of the attachment,87 it may be argued that
the extension of the Court's reasoning in Sniadach to the prejudgment attachment of property other than wages would impose a great
burden on the courts. In every case, there would be the potential for
objections based on the due process clause. Even in cases in which
such objections are ordinarily not well founded-such as cases involving the attachment of real estate-the defendant might attempt
to show that his is a special case, requiring dissolution of the attachment on the ground of individual hardship. The great majority of
these motions, however, would be susceptible of summary disposition. Only those motions involving a substantial probability of individual hardship should occupy much of the court's time. Moreover,
a body of case law indicating the circumstances in which attachments
would normally be dissolved should develop fairly rapidly. When
that case law has developed, it is likely that motions would be made
only in cases similar to those in which prejudgment attachments
have previously been dissolved. Indeed, the net effect of applying
Sniadach to the attachment of other kinds of property could even be
to conserve courts' time, since creditors might be discouraged from attaching property in situations in which it has become clear that the
attachment would be dissolved on the defendant's motion.
To the extent that there remains some danger of clogging the
courts, that result may best be avoided by the drafting of comprehensive new attachment and garnishment statutes. 88 The drafting
of such statutes, however, may prove to be extremely difficult, because the constitutionality of a particular prejudgment attachment
procedure may depend on the distinctive facts of a particular case.
87. Mrs. Sniadach raised her claim under the due process clause in this manner.
395 U.S. at 346. Since a claim under the due process clause centers around the allegation that the loss of the use of property pending a hearing deprives the debtor of
necessities and causes hardship, the issue would be largely rendered moot by waiting
until the hearing on the merits to raise it. Cf., e.g., MICH. Cr. R. 738.16, quoted in
note 89 infra.
88. In addition, if courts in a particular jurisdiction are reluctant to engage in the
difficult and time-consuming factual analysis required to determine what property is
"essential" or which assets the defendant actually "needs"--determinations necessary
to a constitutional decision in a particular case-the legislature may be able to enact
statutes to deal with these problems. See note 73 supra and note 89 infra and accompanying text.
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The best solution seems to lie in devising a statute with broadly
phrased provisions that are in line with the general conclusions of
this Note. Such a statute would seem to be fair in the great majority
of cases. In order to deal with exceptional cases, the statute could
provide some speedy preliminary procedure for dissolution of the
attachment on a defendant's showing of individual hardship. Because the public interests do not vary with the defendant's situation,
they can be considered without argument in every case, and an ex
parte hearing would be sufficient to deal with the hardship claim. 80

III.

PROCEDURAL RULES THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST
POOR LITIGANTS

While the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to
protect the rights of indigent criminal defendants, 00 it has failed to
take comparable action on behalf of indigent civil litigants.91 Many
89. For an example of a method currently in use for alleviating exceptional hardship in garnishment situations, see MICH. CT. R. 738.16:
Dissolution of Garnishment without Bond.
(1) In exceptional circumstances, on notice and hearing, the court may, in the
interests of justice, set aside a garnishment in whole or in part upon the furnishing of a bond in an amount less than prescribed in sub-rules 738.14 and
738.15, conditioned as therein provided. The court should give full consideration to the following factors:
(a) The nature of the plaintiff's claim, whether it is liquidated or unliquidated;
(b) The solvency of the principal defendant;
(c) The likelihood of loss to the plaintiff if garnishment is terminated;
(d) The relative priorities of the claims of employees and other persons;
(e) The likelihood of irreparable harm to the garnishee defendant if garnishment is not terminated.
(2) Garnishment shall not be set aside under (1) if the garnishment is based on
a judgment against the principal defendant.
The Michigan rule, however, calls for an adversary hearing. The time needed to
comply with this requirement may defeat the purposes of providing a preliminary
dissolution procedure. But see note 78 supra.
90. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in which the Court held that the
practice of charging defendants for trial transcripts which are necessary to prepare an
appeal violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), in which the Court held that
the due process clause guarantees a right to counsel in criminal cases regardless of
ability to pay.
91. See Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967), in which the Court refused to
consider a Georgia summary-eviction statute requiring that the tenant defendant post
bond in order to defend the action [GA. CODE ANN. § 61-303 (1966)]. Justice Douglas, in
an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren, dissented, arguing that serious issues based
on the equal protection clause were raised. The same Georgia bond requirement is
before the Court again. State v. Sanks, 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E.2d 19 (1969), prob. juris.
noted, 395 U.S. 974 (1969). This case has been argued before the Court and its decision
is pending. 38 U.S.L.W. 3220 (1969). In a case argued the same day, Simmons v. West
Haven Housing Authority, 5 Conn. Cir. 282, 250 A.2d 527, prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S.
957 (1969), the Court has been asked to reverse a holding of the Circuit Court of
Connecticut, Appellate Division, that a Connecticut statute requiring a tenant to post
a bond in order to appeal an adverse decision in an eviction action does not violate
the equal protection clause even when applied to indigents. In Sandoval v. Rattikin,
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states continue to enforce rules that put the poor litigant in a civil
action at an unfair disadvantage. 92 But the Sniadach holding that
prejudgment wage garnishment is a violation of the due process
clause may be helpful in developing arguments which, in conjunction with those developed under the equal protection clause, may
be used to expand the rights of indigent civil litigants.
One practice which might be halted on the basis of the reasoning implicit in Sniadach is that which requires litigants to post a
bond in order to defend or bring an action. 93 Requiring a poor person to post a bond as a prerequisite to engaging in a civil action is
similar to a prejudgment garnishment of his wages in that both
practices deprive the person of the use of his funds before he has
been afforded a hearing in which to vindicate his claim. In both
cases, the funds will be returned to the defendant if he wins. Of
course, the bond requirement differs somewhat from prejudgment
wage garnishment, since in the latter situation the defendant is
directly deprived of the use of his funds, while in the former the
poor litigant has the alternative of failing to post a bond and thus
forefeiting his legal rights. But in both cases, the property interest
involved is the use of funds which may be needed to purchase the
necessities of life. Rights are of little value without remedies; and so
if a poor litigant wishes to enforce his rights, he is compelled to post
the bond and thus frequently to forgo the basic necessities because
1195 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966), the Texas
Court found that denying indigent defendants free counsel in a civil trespass-to-trytitle action was not a denial of due process. Of course, the Court has acted against prejudgment wage garnishment (Sniadach); and it has required that notice of trial must,
whenever practicable, be more effective than that given through newspaper publication
[Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
&: Trust Co., 1139 U.S. 1106 (1950)].
But cf. In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P .2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968), in which
the Supreme Court of California held that the due process clause requires that an
indigent defendant imprisoned under the process of mesne civil arrest be provided
appointed counsel.
92. See note 91 supra and notes 93-94 infra.
93. For an example of a procedural requirement that a bond be posted in order to
defend an action, see the Georgia statute discussed in note 91 supra. Numerous state
laws and court rules require the posting of a bond in order to bring an action. A New
York court rule, for example, requires the posting of a bond of not less than $250 in
order to bring an attachment suit. N.Y.R. CIV. PRAc. 6212(b). An Ohio statute provides that a private action in equity for the abatement of a nuisance may be brought
only upon the posting of a bond of not less than $500. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.03
(Page 1954). Under Michigan law, a plaintiff may be required to post a bond in order
to bring suit against a nonresident defendant [MrcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.741
(1968)], while California law requires a nonresident to post a bond in order to bring
suit [CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE § 1030 (West 1954)].
There is no need to distinguish defendants and plaintiffs for purposes of this due
process analysis, since in either case the poor person is faced with deciding between
waiver of a legal.right or the present use of his funds. The situation of a defendant
who suffers a default judgment, however, seems more compelling than that of the
plaintiff who cannot afford to file suit.
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he cannot afford to pay for both. The bond requirement, then, not
only has a chilling effect on the litigant's right to bring or defend
an action, but it can clearly deprive the litigant of needed funds
before he has had an opportunity for a hearing. The rationale of
Sniadach might well be applied to prevent such a deprivation. 94
I£ Sniadach is interpreted to require a meaningful hearing before
a person may be deprived of the use of needed property,95 then its
underlying reasoning might also be useful in arguing that the due
process clause requires extension of the right to counsel to civil
litigants. Since a litigant's right to a hearing is often worthless unless
he has counsel,96 the civil litigant today must pay for counsel in
order to have a meaningful hearing; and the poor litigant frequently
cannot do so unless he gives up the necessities of life. Thus, the
94. In addition, many states have requirements that a litigant pay a fee in
order to engage in a civil action. For example, Connecticut and twenty-six other states
do not exempt indigents from a general requirement that court fees and costs be paid
in order to obtain divorce. CIVIL LIBERTIES, April 1969, at 6, col. 3. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968), a three-judge district court upheld this
practice against a class action brought on behalf of indigent women in Connecticut
who alleged that the requirement was violative of the equal protection clause and the
due process clause. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 395 U.S. 974
(1969). But cf. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968), in
which the court held that a statute requiring service of summons by publication in
divorce actions based on abandonment operated as an effective barrier to indigent
plaintiffs' access to the courts and thus constituted a denial of equal protection. Fee
requirements are also a problem to indigents in bankruptcy cases. The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently rejected an attack on the
constitutionality of fee requirements in the bankruptcy situation. It refused to review
a referee's order denying the bankrupt's motion to vacate the order for payment of
filing fees and to proceed in forma pauperis. 44 REF. J. 5 (1970). For a criticism of fee
requirements in bankruptcy cases, see Shaeffer, Proceedings in Bankruptcy In Forma
Pauperis, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1202 (1969).
Since fee requirements deprive a litigant of the property itself and not merely of
the use of it, Sniadach docs not apply directly. When poor litigants are involved,
however, such fees should be subject to challenge on the same rationale as that in
Sniadach. Since the fee requirement forces a poor person to choose between purchasing
necessities and exercising his legal rights in a meaningful way, it requires that an indigent who wishes to pursue his rights sacrifice needed funds before he has had a
hearing. The rationale of Sniadach would, at least arguably, prohibit such a deprivation. Moreover, since the fee requirement is arguably a permanent taking of property,
it would seem to present even a stronger case than would a bond requirement.
95. The Court has stated in previous cases that a fundamental requirement of the
due process clause is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), discussed in note
29 supra. See also Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 415 (1955); Ohio Bell Tel.
Co. v. Public Util. Commn., 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937) (The hearing must provide for "the
protection of the individual against arbitrary action."). With respect to the procedural
safeguards which constitute a meaningful hearing in the garnishment context, and
with respect to the question whether Sniadach requires a full trial-type hearing, see
note 20 supra. Of course, the Court has also required meaningful notice of a hearing.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), discussed in note
29 supra.
96. In re Gault, 387 U.S. l (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); In re Harris,
69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968).
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failure to provide free counsel to the indigent civil litigant deprives
him of needed funds before he can have a meaningful hearing. 97
Sniadach may be helpful in arguing that such deprivation is a deprivation of property without due process of law and that therefore
the poor litigant should be assigned counsel in civil cases. 98
In determining the validity under the due process clause of
procedural practices that discriminate against poor litigants, the
courts should again employ a balancing test; 99 but the interests to
be balanced in this context are somewhat different from those
previously considered with regard to attachment and garnishment
procedures. 100 The principal individual interest which the practices
of requiring the litigant to post a bond and to bear the initial costs
of litigation may offend is the interest in retaining the use of funds
needed to buy the essentials of life during the pendency of an action
in which one is seeking to pursue or to defend his legal rights. In
addition to this substantial individual interest, there is a public
interest in providing all persons easy access to the courts in order to
promote the peaceful resolution of private disputes.
The basic argument in favor of the present procedural practices
is that they discourage the litigation of spurious claims. It might
be argued that the elimination of this obstacle for indigents would
grant the poor litigant free rein to utilize the courts for harassment
purposes; his former position of unfair disadvantage would arguably
be exchanged for one of unfair advantage. This problem can be
avoided, however, by requiring the indigent to make a preliminary
showing of good faith before granting his motion for waiver of a
bond requirement or for appointed counsel. With respect to bond
requirements, there is an additional interest in providing a fund
97. Here again, as in the fee requirement situation, the deprivation is of the
property itself and not merely of the use of it. See note 94 supra.
Although poor plaintiffs may be able to get representation by working out a contingent-fee arrangement, that option is not generally available to low-income defendants.
Moreover, much of the litigation in which the poor are likely to become involved as
plaintiffs, such as divorce actions and eviction suits, do not result in a monetary award if
successful, and thus no contingent fee can be generated. B. SELIGMAN, POVERTY AS A
Punuc IssuE 183-91 (1965); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1322, 1324 (1966).
98. The Federal Trade Commission has recently ruled that indigent respondents
in hearings before the FTC are entitled to have counsel provided by the Government. The Commission stated: '1.Ve can think of nothing less conducive to fairness
and due process in administrative procedures than to pit the power of the state • . .
against a single individual and then to deny that individual the right to counsel
••••" In re American Chinchilla Corp., 38 U.S.L.W. 2386 (FTC Dec. 23, 1969); cf.
In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P .2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968), discussed in note 91
supra; Schuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession
and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20, 55 (1969).
99. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
100. See text accompanying notes 62-89 supra. Some of the interests previously
discussed, such as the interest in promoting the extension of credit, are irrelevant
outside the field of debt collection.
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from which a successful adversary may receive reimbursement if he
is ultimately awarded costs. That interest may be protected, however, by scrutinizing requests for the waiver of bond requirements
more carefully than requests for the waiver of other procedural requirements.101 Finally, a potentially great financial burden on the
government may result from modifying present procedures. In
addition to the direct cost of providing counsel to indigent civil litigants, the cost of administering the court system could rise sharply if
the elimination of some of the present barriers should lead to increased litigation.
While the arguments favoring the present procedures are not
insignificant, they do not seem compelling. The most important
interests which present practices seek to protect may be protected
by alternative means; and the other interests do not weigh heavily
in the balance in comparison with the combination of the strong
individual interest in the immediate use of needed funds-an interest which was recognized in Sniadach-and the public interest in
freely accessible courts.

IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF RELIEVABLE DURESS

Relievable duress is a doctrine which provides relief to a defendant who, under the pressure of coercive tactics, has settled a
spurious claim or has paid an inflated settlement for a legitimate
claim. The issue of duress may be raised either as a defense in a suit
to enforce the settlement or else in ·a separate action to obtain restitution of excess money paid.102 Unfortunately, courts have been
extremely reluctant to recognize the pressure exerted through prejudgment attachment or garnishment as the type of cpercion that
gives rise to a claim or defense under the duress doctrine, at least
in the absence of proof that the creditor knew that his original claim
was unfounded. Rather, the decisions have generally adopted the
view that it cannot be considered duress to do what one has a legal
right to do. 103 Although the vast majority of opinions have denied
defendants relief on that ground, the few courts which have applied
the duress doctrine to attachment problems have employed a ratio101. Unlike bond requirements, fee requirements serve to protect the adversary
only to the extent that they discourage the institution of spurious claims. Instead of
indemnifying the adversary, fees are used to offset the administrative expense of the
judicial system. Thus, fee requirements should be freely waived. See also note 94
supra.
102. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MxcH. L. REv. 253,
256 (1947).
103. Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Feeney Tool Co., 97 Conn.
129, 132, 115 A. 629, 630 (1921): "If . . . the payment is made under the stress of
lawful process lawfully used, the party can obtain no relief •••• Lawful compulsion
is no duress." See also Kohler v. Wells, Fargo &: Co., 26 Cal. 606 (1864); Paulson v.
Barger, 132 Iowa 547, 109 N.W. 1081 (1906).
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nale similar to that used in Sniadach and have found particular
prejudgment procedures unduly coercive. In two cases the duress
doctrine was used to abate the injustice of prejudgment wage garnishment.104 In a third case relief was granted on the ground of
duress when the plaintiff garnished cash debts owed to the defendant, knowing that the defendant badly needed the funds. 105
In the future, courts confronted with the duress issue in attachment cases will have to consider the impact of the Sniadach opinion.
The recognition in Sniadach of the pressure that can be exerted
through prejudgment wage garnishment106 should spur a complete
re-evaluation of the relievable duress doctrine as it is applied to
attachments generally. In particular, it should cause courts to take
a critical look at the maxim of current duress law that denies relief
to the defendant under any circumstances in cases in which the
plaintiff has a legal right to bring the attachment suit.107
In addition to providing a more rational legal process, a modernized duress doctrine could be of substantial practical benefit to a
defendant who is wrongfully subjected to prejudgment attachment
procedures. 'When a defendant's property is attached prior to a
hearing, the customary manner in which the defendant may raise
objections based on the due process clause is upon motion for dismissal of the attachment. But it is impractical for many defendants
to adopt that course, since a hearing upon such a motion often involves more lengthy court action than does proceeding to a trial on
the merits,108 and that extended length of time prior to resolution
of the dispute increases the injury resulting from loss of the use of
the attached property. For example, a defendant who is left without
a means of transportation when his automobile is attached will
probably be unwilling to give up the use of his car for the extended
period required to litigate a claim under the due process clause.
Thus, if the motion-for-dismissal procedure remains the only means
available to challenge prejudgment attachment on the basis of the
due process clause, extension of the reasoning of Sniadach into the
area of attachments generally may be very slow. A modern duress
doctrine, however, might alleviate this largely practical impediment
to asserting claims under the due process clause. If relief on the
ground of duress were made available in these cases, a defendant
104. American Medical &: Dental Assn. v. Brown, 140 Colo. 341, 344 P.2d 189
(1959); Kelley v. Osborn, 86 Mo. App. 239 (1900).
105. Vine v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, 1 N.W. 997 (1879).
106. See text accompan}ing notes 42-47 supra.
107. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
108. The best example of the time involved in litigating the due process issue on a
motion to dismiss the attachment is Sniadach itself. The defendant in that case filed
the motion to dismiss December 23, 1966, and waited until June 9, 1969, for final
rc,olution of the issue by the Supreme Court. 395 U.S. at 346.
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would be able to agree to a settlement, procure dissolution of the
attachment, and thereafter bring a suit for restitution of the amount
alleged to be excessive and extracted through coercion. 109 Under this
suggested procedure, the claim under the due process clause would
be litigated in the suit for restitution, and any prejudgment attach•
ment or garnishment found not to comport with due process of law
would be declared to be per se coercive.
In summary, the Court's recognition in Sniadach of the coercive
effect of wage garnishment should greatly affect the doctrine of relievable duress, which has almost consistently denied that any "legal"
procedure can be found to be illegally coercive. If the doctrine is
expanded to include coercive attachment practices that have traditionally been considered beyond its purview, debtors, by alleging
duress, will be able to litigate the constitutionality of various forms
of attachment without a continued loss of the use of their property.

V.

PosTJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT

Another significant role which both Sniadach and a re-evaluated
duress doctrine could play in expanding the scope of debtors' rights
lies in the area of postjudgment garnishments. Of course, it might be
argued that, since Sniadach is primarily a case involving procedural
due process, it is inapplicable to attachments and garnishments that
take place after a hearing has been provided and a decision has been
reached by a competent court.110 But unfair treatment of poor debtors may be a problem in cases involving postjudgment garnishments as well as in cases involving prejudgment garnishments.
Indeed, the Sniadach proscription of prejudgment wage garnishment could arguably be illusory unless some type of relief is
fashioned to aid those debtors injured by abuses of postjudgment
garnishment.
Creditors can make the provision for a hearing a sham by employing such procedures as sewer service, in which the debtor never
gets notice of the hearing and does not even learn of the proceedings
until after a default judgment has been entered. 111 Even though the
109. Although duress may also be raised as an affirmative defense to a suit on a
settlement agreement, such a suit might well be initiated through another attachment,
and thus the defendant will have gained nothing.
110. See Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285 (1924), in
which the Court held that the due process clause does not require that notice and an
opportunity for a hearing be afforded to a judgment debtor before issuance of a writ
of garnishment. See also Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed per curiam, 395 U.S. 825 (1969), which is discussed in notes 119-25 infra and
accompanying text and in note 127 infra and accompanying text.
111. The phrase "sewer service" describes the practice whereby a local process
server swears in an affidavit tha"t he has personally delivered a summons to the named
defendant at the specified address, when in reality he has thrown it away-that is,
"into the sewer"-or left it under a door, in a mailbox, or with a person known not
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failure to give notice to the defendant is a ground for opening a
default judgment,112 it is questionable whether or not the debtor
may thereby be returned to his former position if the judgment
creditor has already filed a garnishment in execution of the judgment. In those states in which no notice is required prior to a postjudgment garnishment,113 for example, the debtor may remain
unaware of the entire proceeding until his wages have actually been
paid to his creditor. In order to recover, he must then successfully
maintain a suit for restitution from his creditor.114 Pending the
outcome of that claim, the alleged debtor will have been deprived
of the use and enjoyment of his wages without an opportunity for
a hearing. It was precisely this situation which was held in Sniadach
to be an unconstitutional deprivation of property.11 5 In order to
comply with the mandate of Sniadach, then, courts must provide
to be the defendant named. Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 C0Lu111. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 17 (1967). This article quotes a New York assistant attorney general and
local defense attorneys as testifying that sewer service "virtually permeates the service
of legal process in the Civil Court in the City of New York" and that its extent is
"very widespread," "epidemic," and "pervasive in consumer and landlord-tenant cases."
Id. at 18. The authors further report that in most cases, the judgment debtor is not
notified by the court of the default judgment rendered against him and that the first
notice which he has of any of the proceedings comes at the time that his employer
notifies him that his wages have been garnished. Id. at 20. See also Kripke, Gesture and
Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1969).
The creditor also has available other legal methods of placing the debtor at a
disadvantage. One method is by manipulation of the secured sales transaction under
article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. An example of such a transaction is the
secured installment credit sale of automobiles. See Schuchman, Profit on Default: An
Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. R.Ev. 20 (1969).
Another method is to require confession of judgment as a condition of credit. See Note,
Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 524 (1954). A third method, closely
analogous to wage garnishment, is to require a wage assignment as a condition of credit.
See Note, Prejudgment Wage Garnishment and the Right To Be Heard, 64 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 750, 761-64 (1969).
112. See, e.g., Stubbs v. McGillis, 44 Colo. 138, 96 P. 1005 (1908); Harralson v.
McArthur, 87 Ga. 478, 13 S.E. 594 (1894); Edson v. Edom, 108 Mass. 590 (1867);
Lowman v. Ballard, 168 N.C. 16, 84 S.E. 21 (1915); Shanholtzer v. Thompson, 29 Okla.
198, 103 P. 595 (1909). In New York, default judgments obtained following sewer
service are so frequently opened that collection lawyers will agree to open a default
judgment upon receiving a telephone call from the debtor's lawyer. Kripke, supra note
Ill, at 38.
IHI. New Mexico, for example, permits postjudgment garnishment without requiring notice and a hearing. Moya v. Dellaca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 607 (D.N.M. 1968),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 395 U.S. 825 (1969). The United States Supreme Court has
held that the due process clause does not require notice prior to postjudgment garnishment. Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285 (1924), discussed
in note 110 supra.
114. New York, for example, provides that a court setting aside a judgment may
also direct and enforce restitution. N.Y. Cxv. PRAC, LAw § 5015 (McKinney 1969).
115. Moreover, even if the original claim is genuine, the debtor without notice
prior to judgment is denied the opportunity to pay the debt prior to judgment. The
judgment will generally include collection fees that could have been avoided, and
the debtor's ability to obtain credit in the future will very likely be decreased.
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restitution of the garnished wages when the debtor files a motion to
open the judgment on the ground of lack of notice. It is therefore
submitted that the courts should grant restitution on a preliminary
showing by the wage earner that his motion has some chance of
success.116 In states in which notice is required prior to a wage
execution,117 less extreme measures are necessary. The courts may
protect the wage earner by simply enjoining a levy of execution
pending the hearing on the motion to open the judgment.118
Some of the other possible evils of postjudgment garnishment
are demonstrated by Moya v. DeBaca.119 In that case judgment was
entered against a debtor in a suit instigated by his creditor to recover
a debt. The debtor sought to arrange a method of paying the judgment and offered to make installment payments greater than those
which the creditor could have obtained through garnishment.120 The
creditor refused that offer and demanded cash payment of an amount
that exceeded the value of the judgment.121 In order to gain leverage,
the creditor threatened to garnish the debtor's wages and thus cause
him to be fired. 122 The debtor sought injunctive relief on the basis
of the due process clause, but a three-judge federal district court upheld the constitutionality of the postjudgment wage garnishment
procedure.123 The Supreme Court dismissed the debtor's appeal
without explanation in a per curiam opinion,124 with Justices Harlan
and Brennan arguing that the case should be remanded in light of
Sniadach.125
116. Since the time during which the wage earner is deprived of the enjoyment of
his wages should be kept to a minimum, the courts should expedite the initial screening either through the use of sworn affidavits, or by use of an ex parte hearing. The
penalty of perjury should be sufficient to safeguard against abuse of this procedure
by the wage earner.
117. New York, for example, generally provides for notice to the judgment debtor
twenty days prior to levying against his wages in the hands of his employer. N.Y. C1v.
PRAc. LAw § 5231 (McKinney 1969).
118. In a case in which notice is "required" prior to execution, but nevertheless
not provided, the courts should invoke the procedure suggested above for states with
no notice requirement. See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying te.xt.
119. 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed per curiam, 395 U.S. 825
(1969).
120. 286 F. Supp. at 610 (Judge Theis, dissenting).
121. The creditor's demand also included other claims against the debtor that
were not reduced to judgment. 286 F. Supp. at 610 (Judge Theis, dissenting).
122. 286 F. Supp. at 610 (Judge Theis, dissenting).
123. Judge Theis dissented, however, and argued that wage garnishment statutes

deny low-income wage earners equal protection and hence are unconstitutional on
that ground. 286 F. Supp. at 610-14. In particular, see the discussion at 613.
124. 395 U.S. 825 (1969). It is unclear exactly what the Supreme Court's dismissal
means. If the Court felt that no substantial federal question was presented, then the
decision probably was on the merits. See R. STERN &: E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURf
358 (1968).
125. 395 U.S. at 825.
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It is submitted that Justices Harlan and Brennan were correctthat, although procedural due process may not be denied in a case
dealing with postjudgment garnishment, such a case should be reviewed in light of Sniadach. As Moya itself indicates, postjudgment
garnishment procedures can be used to exert extreme pressure on
debtors: a judgment creditor may be able to garnish the wages of
the debtor and thereby force him to lose his job if the latter refuses
to pay the judgment on the creditor's terms. To the extent that
Sniadach reflects some considerations of substantive due process,126
that case may indicate a willingness on the part of the Court to
proscribe this type of pressure.127 A fair solution to this problem
would be to refuse to enforce postjudgment garnishment in cases in
which the debtor has in good faith offered a payment plan with
installments equal to, or greater than, the amount obtainable
through garnishment. 128
A further problem demonstrated by Moya is that a creditor may
threaten postjudgment garnishment in order to coerce the debtor
to pay an inflated amount that includes additional claims not reduced to judgment.129 The availability of this type of leverage to
force the settlement of inflated claims was one of the evils of wage
garnishment expressly cited by the Court in invalidating prejudg126. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
127. On the other hand, the Court's dismissal of the appeal in Moya may indicate

the opposite-that the Court is not willing to review the validity of postjudgment
garnishment. That indication is strengthened by the fact that the lower court in
Moya had specifically refused to hear testimony regarding the effect of either pre- or
postjudgment wage garnislunent:
The questions of whether the garnishment laws work a hardship upon the eco·
nomically depressed, and whether or not the statutes need revision, are for the
Legislature and not for this Court. It need not be testified to that the present
provisions are oppressive, or that their effect upon low-income families is disastrous
and that reasonable men might find this unacceptable. However, "[t]he criterion
of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good."
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Adkins v. Children's Hospital ..• , 261 U.S.
525, 570, •••• We may not declare a statute unconstitutional solely upon the
ground that it is unjust and oppressive and will work hardship upon the poor.
286 F. Supp. 606, 609 (1968). Nevertheless, in the last analysis, the Court's silence in
.Moya leaves unresolved the question whether or not its decision was in fact on the
merits. If the Court is willing in the future to recognize explicitly the considerations
of substantive due process that it only hinted at in Sniadach, it might also be willing
to overcome its reticence to deal on tl1ose grounds with the issue of postjudgment
garnishment.
128. At first glance this solution seems unfair to the creditor. However, the lever•
age to force settlements whicll is arguably desirable for prejudgment garnishment has
no application after judgment. Postjudgment garnislunent is solely a method for ex•
ecution of a judgment. If the debtor offers a payment plan in good faith, that is, if
he cannot offer a lump-sum payment, the creditor is in no worse position if he accepts
this plan than he would be if he were to garnish the debtor's wages, and he may be
spared some incidental costs of collection.
129. If garnislunent actually occurs, the unadjudicated portion of the claim is
simply a prejudgment garnishment. This garnislunent fits squarely within the holding
of Sniadach and may readily be dissolved on that ground.
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ment wage garnishment in Sniadach.13 0 Although this type of abuse
of postjudgment garnishment is probably not prevalent enough to
induce the Court to proscribe the postjudgment procedure entirely,
the doctrine of relievable duress, as re-evaluated in light of Sniadach
to apply to attachments and garnishments, could afford relief to the
coerced debtor. In such a situation, a modern duress doctrine could
afford either restitution of the excess payment or a valid defense to
a suit for nonpayment of an inflated settlement. 13'

130. See note 45 supra.
131. While this Note covers some of the most important areas in which the
Sniadach ruling could have impact, it has by no means covered all the areas which
may be affected by this important case. It is probable that Sniadach principles will
be used to challenge many other procedures now in force. In at least three separate
suits, for example, state procedures which can result in the prejudgment deprivation
of various forms of property have recently been challenged under the due process
clause. In Hebing v. Household Fin. Corp. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Onondaga County), a suit
that has been dropped from the docket, the plaintiff argued that N.Y. PERS. PROp.
LAw §§ 46 to 49-b (McKinney 1962), which deals with wage assignments, denied them
due process of law under the principles of Sniadach, because that section provides for
deductions under a wage assignment without prior notice and an opportunity for a
hearing. 3 CLEARINGHOUSE RaV. 194 (1969). In Lawson v. Mantell, (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Albany
County, filed Aug. 20, 1969), buyers challenged the constitutionality of N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAW art. 71 (McKinney 1969), which allows a seller to repossess merchandise upon the
posting of a bond in an amount twice the value of the property to be seized. The

buyers argued that this provision denies them due process under the principles of
Sniadach, since it affords buyers no opportunity to present a defense prior to seizure
of the property. 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 105 (1969). The lower court opinion was adverse to plaintiffs. When the Appellate Division refused to stay the implementation of
article 71 pending appeal, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court and obtained
a temporary restraining order. The case has been argued before a three-judge court,
but the court has not yet rendered its decision. In Klim v. Jones, No. 52, 332 (N.D. Cal.,
filed Sept. 30, 1969) a three-judge federal district court has been convened to decide
the constitutionality in light of Sniadach, of the California Innkeepers Baggage-Lien
Law, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1861(a) (West 1969), which allows California hotel keepers to
seize personal property of tenants upon an unverified claim that rent is owing.

